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Advances in medical technology, discoveries in pharmacology, and
developments in bio-engineering have made it possible for the
modem physician to save and/or sustain the lives of individuals who
but a few decades ago would have died. These developments have
proved a mixed blessing. While on the one hand they have allowed
the physician to exercise his profession more successfully, on the
other they have opened up before him a domain of decision
problems that few of his predecessors have had to face. The thrust
of these problems may be focussed into a single question: Ought he
to employ the techniques, drugs and devices thus at his disposal in
all cases, or ought he to proceed selectively?
In many instances this question is resolvable by an appeal to the
wishes of the patient himself. Whatever the legalities of the matter,
physicians have generally operated and continue to operate on the
principle that the expressed desire on part of an otherwise competent
patient not to receive resuscitative, sustaining or heroic measures is
not eo ipso indicative of diminished capacity and therefore should
be honoured. 1 In other cases, the economics of the situation produce
a triage context in which universal allocation is ruled out in any case
and the only question that arises is whom to select, and on what
basis. 2 However, there is a third array of cases where no triage
*Eike-Henner W. Kluge, Department of Philosophy, University of Victoria.
1. Cf. Lance Tibbles, "Is He Dead? Should He be Allowed to Die? Who
decides?" Conn. Med. 39:11 (1975) at p. 734. Charles H. Montange, "Informed
Consent and the Dying Patient", The Yale Law Journal 83 (July 1, 1971) 1632, at
1634, 1648, 1649 f. etc., esp. 1656 f.; Michael T. Sullivan, "The Dying Person:
His Plight and his Right" NELR 8 at 197; W. H. Baugham et al., "Euthanasia:
Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations" Notre Dame
Latyer, 48: 5 (June, 1973) at 1219. Aranson, The Right to Die: Decisions and
Decision Makers (New York, 1974) at 59.
2. Cf. F. J. Ayd, Jr. "The Hopeless Case: Medical and Moral Considerations",
Journal of the American Medical Association 181 (1962) at 1099; Diana Crane,
The Sanctity of Social Life: Physicians' Treatment of Critically Ill Patients (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975); Marvin Kohl, Beneficent Euthanasia
(Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1975); Charles Fried, "Terminating Life Support:
Out of the Closet", New England Journal of Medicine 295 (August 12, 1976) at
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pressures obtain3 but where informed consent is not possible either.
The cases in question range from those of infants who are so
physiologically aberrant and defective that they might well be called
monsters4, to those of irremedially brain-damaged and comatose
adult human beings at the other end of life. 5
The present article, although wider in its implications, focusses
on only one part of this spectrum: On the array of cases that involves
radically defective and cerebrally at best only rudimentarily
developed (or severely damaged) neonates who require prompt
surgical and/or medical intervention in order to survive but who,
even with such intervention, will not survive their first year. The
questions that the article will address are the following: Does the
attending physician, and do the associated medical personnel, have
an obligation to intervene constructively in such cases? Alterna-
tively, may they allow the infant to die without active interference
390; "Optimum Care for Hopelessly Ill Patients. A Report of the Critical Care
Committee of the Massachusetts General Hospital", New England Journal of
Medicine 295 (August 12, 1976) at 362; Jery B. Wilson, Death By Decision: The
Medical, Moral, and Legal Dimensions of Euthanasia (Philadephia: The
Westminster Press, 1975); S.C. Stein et al., "Selection for Early Treatment in
Myelomeningocele: A Retrospective Analysis of Various Selection Procedures",
Pediatrics 54:5 (November 1974) at 553; A. R. Jonsen, et al., "Critical Issues in
Newborn Intensive Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal", Pediatrics,
55:6 (June, 1975) at 756; K. Vaux, Who Shall Live? (Philadelphia, Fortress Press,
1970); R. H. Williams, To Live and To Die: When, Why and How, (New York:
Springer, 1973); R. S. Duff and A. G. M. Campbell, "Moral and Ethical
Dimensions in the Special Care Nursery", (1973) New England Journal of
Medicine 289 at 890; J. Lorber, "Criteria of Selection of Patients for Treatment",
Fourth International Conference on Birth Defects, (Vienna, 1973); G. K. Smith
and E. D. Smith, "Selection for Treatment in Spina Bifida Cystica", (1973)
British Medical Journal 4, at 189; David J. Roy, Medical Wisdom and Ethics in the
Treatment of Severely Defective Newborn and Young Children (Montreal: Eden
Press, 1978); H. T. Englehardt, Jr., "Euthanasia and Children: The Injury of
Continued Existence", (1973) Journal of Pediatrics 83, at 170; T. J. O'Donnell,
"The Morality of Triage", Georgetown Medical Bulletin 14 (August, 1960) at 68;
W. P. Williams, "Should the Patient be Kept Alive?" Medical Economics 44
(January 9, 1967) at 60.
3. Or at least where these are not of decisive importance. To a certain degree, no
medical facility is free of such pressures, since neither human nor material
resources are unlimited.
4. Cf. Bracton, cited in G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law
(1957) at 20 f.; Blackstone talks of the "shape of mankind" and Luther, in his
Table Talks, refers to "monsters".
5. For a good bibliography on the subject, see A Selected and Partially Annotated
Bibliography of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, compiled by S. Sollitto and
R. M. Veatch, revised by I. D. Singer (Hastings-on-Hudson, New York: The
Hastings Centre, 1978).
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on their part to hasten its demise? Or, finally, may they directly
procure its death or engage in such overt measures as are known to
lead to or to accelerate its death?
This series of questions may be approached from two distinct
theoretical points of view: the legal, and the moral. Is there a legal
obligation in such cases? Is there a moral one?6 The discussion that
follows will consider both of these issues; that is to say, it will
address both the question of what the legalities of the matter are and
the question of what they ought to be. There is no explicit Canadian
case law on the subject. Consequently the discussion will concern
itself mainly with statutory considerations. More specifically, it will
argue that current statutes touching the subject are unworkable, that
they incorporate a crucial ambiguity centering around the use of
"human being" and "person", and that nothing short of a
fundamental redrafting of the relevant sections of the Criminal Code
will resolve the issue. It will also be argued that even aside from
this, the Code fails to reflect both popular and medical ethical
opinion, and that therefore any redrafting should be such as to bring
it into step with current understanding of the ethics of the matter.
This, so it will be suggested, can only be effected by a statutory
acceptance of the distinction between human being and person
respectively, and by a provision for the mandatory euthanatizing of
radically defective neonates in certain cases.
Euthanasia of radically defective neonates is a matter of medical
reality in other countries. 7 There is no reason to suppose that
Canada is a medical enclave in this matter, differing from all the
rest. In fact, as we shall see in a moment, quite the reverse is the
case. Nevertheless, as was mentioned above, there is an essential
6. 1 shall ignore the pragmatic imperatives except insofar as they impinge on the
ethics and legalities at stake.
7. Cf. John A. Robertson, "Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A
Legal Analysis," (1975), 27 Stanford Law Review 213, at 214; R. S. Duff and A.
G. M. Campbell, "Moral and Ethical Dilemnas in the Special-Care Nursery",
(1973), New England Journal of Medicine 289, at 890, where 43 cases over a 21/2
year period are discussed; and, "On Deciding the Care of Severely Handicapped or
Dying Persons: With Particular Reference to Infants", Pediatrics 57 (April, 1976)
at 487; John Lorber, "Selective Treatment of Myelomeningocele: To Treat or Not
to Treat", Pediatrics 53 (March 1974) at 307; Michael J. Garland, "Care of the
Newborn: The Decision Not to Treat" Perinatology/Neonatology I
(September/October, 1977) at 14; W. L. Langer, "Infanticide: A Historicat
Survey" History of Childhood Quarterly I (Winter 1974), at 353; A. R. Jonsen, R.
H. Phibbs, W. W. Tooley, M. J. Garlan, "Critical Issues in New born Intensive
Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal", Pediatrics, 55:6 (June, 1975)
756, at 761, etc.
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lack of Canadian case law on the subject. Therefore it can only be
surmised that this lack is a function of the exercise of judicial
discretionary power, not of the absence of medical actions.
If the analysis that follows is correct, then this judicial situation is
in part a result of the terminological ambiguity indicated, in part a
result of the judiciary's attempt to compensate for the failure of the
relevant statutes to reflect current ethical standards. The revisions
suggested in the course of the analysis, therefore, will not only have
the advantage of removing statutory unclarity, but also of allowing
the law to approach more closely its ideal of reflecting the ethical
standards of society.
II. The Medical Context
The sort of situation that typically falls under the present rubric may
be exemplified by the following case: A male infant, B, was born
alive but suffering from severe physiological abnormalities,
rudimentary development of the cerebrum, and esophageal atresia.
Both the abnormalities and the atresia required corrective surgery
and/or treatment. Without correction of the atresia, infant B would
have died of dehydration and/or starvation, the former probably
occurring first; but even with such surgery the prognosis was that
infant B would not survive beyond his first year because the other
abnormalities and defects, considered in toto, were simply too
great.8
In this sort of case, it is common medical practice not to intervene
surgically or otherwise, to refrain from intravenous feeding and
similar supportive measures, and simply to leave the infant alone to
die. 9 That course of action was followed in the present case. The
infant died of dehydration and starvation after 17 days. After an
intensive investigation, no charges were laid. The reasoning offered
in support of this involved several parameters: '0 First, it was argued
that since the prognosis for the infant was negative even with
8. The defects included severe hydrocephalus with increased intracranial pressure
and herniation of the cerebellar tonsils; polymicrogyri; severe dysraphism with
deformities of the base of the orbit and nasal structure; multiple limb defects due to
amniotic band syndrome.
9. For a notorious instance of this but without the fatal prognosis if the atresia had
been removed, see the 1971 Johns Hopkins case, discussed in I. M. Gustafson,
"Mongolism, Parental Desire, and the Right to Life", (1973), 16 Perspectives in
Biology and Medicine 529.
10. The following is based on an interview with the responsible judicial
authorities.
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surgical intervention, to enter upon a process of corrective surgery
or even life-sustaining action would merely have had the effect of
prolonging if not of increasing the terminal suffering of the neonate.
Second, it was suggested that the severity and extent of the infant's
incapacitation was so great that even if he had lived he would have
been a continuous burden to his family, and would have constituted
a drain on the medical resources of society as a whole, syphoning
off already scarce medical resources that could have been employed
more usefully elsewhere. Third, it was maintained that a duty to
intervene in any capacity, and afortiori in a medical one, can exist
only where there is a possibility of success. In this situation,
however, the very nature of the case ruled out any possibility of
saving the infant's life. Therefore no duty of medical intervention
obtained. Fourth, it was said that non-interference - the abstaining
from the use of extra-ordinary or heroic measures - was justified
not only in itself, since such measures are never obligatory, but also
did not constitute an act and therefore could not be adjudged
culpable. Fifth, it was contended that in virtue of the nature and
extent of the infant's cerebral incapacitation he was not in fact a
person and that therefore, all things being considered, there was no
duty to attempt to save and/or sustain him in any case."'
Approaching the above from a moral standpoint, the reasoning
involved could be challenged on several accounts. Vis-a-vis the
first, it could be argued that there is an absolute moral duty to
preserve human life,12 that this duty supersedes any consideration
of comfort or even of expected outcome for the recipient of the
relevant action,' 3 and that in any case no human prognosis is
certain. Unexpected, not to say miraculous turns of events have
occurred, and in light of the absolute duty to preserve human life
11. A version of this was proposed in Jonsen, et al., at 758. For a contrary
position, see John A. Robertson, Supra at 216.
12. Cf. A. Schweitzer, Kultur and Ethik (Miinchen: Beck) 1960, esp., chap.
XVIII; W.M. Abbott, "Sacredness of Life", (1963), 108 America 326, and "The
Sanctity of Life", (1959), 101 America 667; G. Boas, "The Sanctity of Life",
Maryland State Medical Journal 2:3 (March, 1953) 128; Karl Barth, Church
Dogmatics (Edinburgh, 1961) II/4 426 f.
13. This argument could find its basis in Kant's position that "humanity and...
every rational creature [is] an end in itself". Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals transi. L. W. Beck (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1959) 49. See also 1. V.
Sullivan, The Morality of Mercy Killing (Newman Press, 1950), 73 et pass.; G.
Boas, Supra; W. M. Abbott, Supra; Karl Barth, Supra at 161; Edward Shils, "The
Sanctity of Life" in D. H. Labby, ed., Life or Death: Ethics and Options
(University of Washington Press, 1968) 29.
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every effort must be made to allow them to take place. 14
To the second consideration it may be responded that it involves a
utilitarian train of reasoning whose acceptance would mark the
beginning of a slide down a slippery slope: from the killing or
allowing to die' 5 of radically defective neonates to the euthanatizing
of those who, on the strictly utilitarian calculus, constitute an
unacceptable (disproportionately large) drain on social facilities and
resources. 16 Furthermore, echoing John Stuart Mill's distinction
between the qualitative and the quantitative parameters of utility, it
could be pointed out that utilitarian considerations like the
preceding would be unacceptably restrictive since they would
ignore the qualitative parameter. More specifically, they would
ignore the benefits that, were the other course of action adopted,
would accrue to the moral side of man. For, "it must never be
forgotten that among the capacities and values to be realized, the
most important are the moral potentialities and values, and these
include the virtues of compassion and devotion to the welfare of
others. Consequently those who devote themselves to the care of
[these individuals] may by so doing be realizing in themselves
greater values than they would if they applied these [resources] to
more selfish pursuits''. 17
The third consideration may be countered by the suggestion that
it radically misconstrues the nature of the physician's obligation. It
is not, as this consideration would have it, to effect a cure. If it
were, every death, every failure to effect any cure whatever, would
constitute a failure to fulfil a duty - and that is absurd. Instead, as
one physician recently put it, "it is the doctor's duty to sustain [the
patient's life] as long as possible;"' 18 and as Muir, J. commented,
"A patient is placed, or places himself, into the care of a physician
14. It should be noted that this argument does not consider the degree of likelihood
of the cure (or revision) as a relevant parameter. Cf. Richard Trubo, An Act of
Mercy (Nash, 1973) 59.
15. See Yale Kamisar "Some Non-religious Reasons Against Proposed
Mercy-Killing Legislation", (1958), 42 Minnesota Law Review 969.
16. Cf. R. H. Williams, Supra, at 88; Joseph Fletcher, "Technological Decisions
in Medical Care" In K. Vaux, ed. Who Shall Live? Medicine, Technology, Ethics
(Philadephia, 1970) 130; R. B. Reeves, "When is it Time to Die? Prologue to
Voluntary Euthanasia", (1973), 8 N.E.L.R. 183, at 190; Eliot Slater, "Health
Service or Sickness Service" in S. Gorovitz et al., Moral Problems in Medicine
(Engtewioed Cliffs: Prentice Hal 1976) at 354.
17. Errol E. Harris, "Respect for Persons," in Richard T. de George, ed., Ethics
andSociety (Garden City, New York 1966) at 128.
18. K.A. Karnofsky, "Why Prolong the Life of a Patient with Advanced
Cancer?" (1960), 101 C.A. Bulletin of Cancer Progress 9.
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with the expectation that he (the physician) will do everything in his
power, everything that is known to modem medicine, to protect the
patient's life". 19 In other words, the reply to this consideration
could focus on the distinction between an act-oriented and an
outcome-oriented appraisal of professions, and could argue that
medicine belongs to the former sort, and coutd then maintain that
therefore the failure or inability to provide a cure or save a life does
not abrogate its act-oriented obligation: to continue to intervene as
long as possible. 20
The fourth reason could be countered in various ways: e.g. by
pointing to the inherent ambiguity of the ordinary-extraordinary
(normal-heroic) distinction, 2' or by arguing that in theory as well as
in practice, the failure to act may itself be tantamount to an act and
that therefore the failure to intervene cannot be adjudged
non-culpable simply because it does not involve any action.22
Nor is thefifth reason immune for critique. It could be challenged
by denying the alleged distinction between "human being" and
".person";23 or by admitting it but questioning its moral
relevance; 24 or simply by challenging anyone who advances this
19. Muir, J., quoted in Hilda Regier, "Judge Rules for Respirator Use and
Traditional Medical Standards", Journal of Legal Medicine (November/December
1975) 10.
20. Cf. Johnston v. Wellesley Hospital [1971] 2 O.R. 103, at 111; Addy, J.: "A
Physician gives no guarantee of success", but guarantees the performance of a
certain kind of action. See also Town v. Archer (1902), 4 O.L.R. 383, at 388,
where it is stated that success may be looked for only on the basis of express prior
agreement. R.E. Cooke, "Whose Suffering?" in Gorovitz, et al. at 357.
21. Cf. Robert M. Veatch, Death, Dying and the Biological Revolution (New
Haven: Yale University Press 1976) at 105-115; Paul Ramsey, The Patient as
Person (New Haven: Yale University Press 1970) at 120 f. et pass.; John A.
Robertson, "Involuntary Euthanasia", at 235.
22. Cf. Otto Kirchheimer, "Criminal Ommissions" (1942), 55 H.L.R. 615 at 618
f., 623; T.P. Barbetta et al., "Euthanasia: A Survey of Medical Decisions"
University of Toronto Medical Journal, 44: 4 (February 1976), pp. 66-69 at p. 69;
Joseph Fletcher, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, at 68; P.J. Fitzgerald, "Acting
and Refraining" Analysis 27: 4 (1973) at 133. But see R.M. Sade and A.B.
Redfern, "Euthanasia" New England Journal of Medicine 292: 16 (April 17,
1975) at 864. See also below.
23. This seems to occur in Maine Medical Center v. Houle, NO. 74-145, at 4
(Super. Ct., Cumberland Cty, February 14, 1974). See also S. Bok, "Ethical
Problems in Abortion", Hastings Center Studies January 1974 33, at 41; D.
Bonhoeffer, Ethik, ed. by E. Bethge (Munich, 1976) at 110; H. Thielicke, "The
Doctor", at 162 f. etc. But see E.-H.W. Kluge, The Practice of Death (New
Haven: Yale University Press 1975) at 93-95 and "Infanticide as the Murder of
Persons" in M. Kohl, ed. Infanticide and the Value of Life
24. Kluge, Supra
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form of reasoning to come up with definitions that are acceptable to
all concerned. 25
III. Section 197 of the Code
But whatever the outcome of these moral considerations, the
statutory facts of the matter are as follows: Section 197 of the Code,
in its relevant parts, states
197 (1) Every one is under a legal duty
(c) to provide the necessaries of life to a person under
his charge if that person
(i) is unable, by reason of detention, age, illness,
insanity or other causes, to withdraw himself
from that charge, and
(ii) is unable to provide himself with the necessaries
of life.
(2) Every one commits an offense who, being under a legal
duty within the meaning of subsection (1), fails without
lawful excuse, the proof of which is upon him, to
perform that duty, if
(b) with respect to a duty imposed by paragraph (1) (c),
the failure to perform the duty endangers the life of
the person to whom the duty is owed or causes or is
likely to cause the health of that person to be injured
permanently.
By this section, the failure to fulfil one's duty of providing the
necessaries of life for the person under one's charge is an offense if
the circumstances are as specified. Consequently, since food and
drink are necessaries of life, 26 the failure in the present instance to
provide them, in full knowledge of the consequences of such a
failure, constitutes a prima facie dereliction of duty within the
meaning of this section.
Once again, there are several ways in which one might try to
invalidate such an inference: by arguing that the infant was not
under the charge of the physician; by claiming that food and drink,
in the sense in which they would have had to be supplied in the
present instance, do not fall within the statutory meaning of
25. Cf. John A. Robertson, supra, pp. 246 ff.
26. This is not only obvious in itself, but also follows from Walkem, J.'s statement
in R, v. Brooks, 9 Brit. Col. L.R. 13 at 18 that "necessaries of life" mean "such
necessaries as tend to preserve life, and not necessaries in their ordinary legal
sense." It is interesting to note that oxygen and other chemical elements necessary
for human metabolic processes are hereby also included. See also R. v. Lewis
(1903), 6 O.L.R. 132, 2 O.W.R. 566,7 C. C.C. 261 (C.A.)
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"necessaries of life"; by arguing that the failure to intervene
medically was not likely to impair the health of the infant
permanently nor that it in fact did so, but that such impairment was
due to other causes; or, finally, by contending that infant B was not
a person and therefore was not entitled to the protection of this
section. Let us consider these seriatim.
(a) Duty of Care
The claim that the infant was not under the charge of the physician
could be supported by the contention that it is the parents that
constitute the proper authority, and that therefore the onus of care
falls upon them. It could also be maintained that even if the duty of
care had lain with the physician or the hospital, Barnett v. Chelsea
and Kensington Hospital Management Committee 2 7 clearly shows
that both would have been absolved from any onus by the fact that
the cause of the infant's debility was irremediable and that he would
have died anyway.
This reasoning, however, is negated by the following considera-
tions: the attending physician, in accepting the task of delivering the
infant, also accepted the infant as being under his care 28 , and could
not consequently rid himself of that onus simply because the nature
of the infant was different from what he had expected and the
execution of his task of care had become more difficult. The means
for discharging his duty of care were available to him: he could have
performed the operation or initiated intravenous feeding. He chose
not to do so. Consequently Regina v. Instan, 2 9 although not directly
on the case, nevertheless indicates the line that must here be
followed. In taking upon himself the "moral obligation" of
delivering and caring for the infant, the physician incurred a "clear
duty at common law to supply [food and drink] to the deceased". 30
As to the case of Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital, it
must be distinguished from the one at hand. There, death would
have occurred from causes other than the lack of medical attention
even if that attention had been forthcoming; 3' here, death would not
have occurred because of dehydration and starvation if care had
27. Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee (1969) 1
Q.B. 428, at 435.
28. Cf. Ybarra v. Spangard, (1944), 25 Cal. (2d) 486, 154 P.2d 687; John A.
Robertsonsupra at 225 ff. See also 0. Holmes, The Common Law (1881) at 278.
29. R. v. Instan (1893), 17 Cox Crim. Cas. 602
30. Id., at 604.
31. See note 27supra
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been extended. It would (probably) have occurred within a year
from the multiple birth defects - but that is not the point at issue
here and now. Therefore, to follow Barnett in this particular
instance would constitute an unwarranted extension that would
license the abandonment of all those who, with reasonable
certitude, are known to die within the year.
(b) Necessaries of Life
In the common law, both food and drink are adjudged necessaries of
life. 32 However - so it might be argued - neither surgical
procedures nor intravenous feeding fall under this rubric. 33
Consequently, so one might continue, even if infant B was under
the charge of the attending physician, the latter's failure to employ
these measures was not an offense under the meaning of this
section.
The claim that intervenous feeding and surgical intervention per
se are not necessaries of life may certainly be admitted. However, to
argue on that basis that therefore the failure to employ either
measure did not fall under the meaning of this section is to
misconstrue the issue. It is not these means that are taken to be the
necessaries in question but the food and drink deliverable by means
of them. Food and drink are necessaries of life, and the means for
delivering them were available to the physician. In fact, it was this
very availability that created the decision-problem in the first place.
Therefore, there did occur a deliberate failure to use the available
means to supply the necessaries of life, and consequently the
applicability of section 197 (2) remains.
(c) Causation
In ordinary life as well as before the law, the fact that two
successive states are causally unrelated suffices to exonerate the
agent of the first from any gravamen attaching to the second. 34
Therefore in cases like that of infant B it is sound strategy to attempt
32. See note 26 supra. See alsoR. v. Senior (1899), 1 Q.B. 283
33. This line of reasoning would be supported by the claim that such measures
would constitute extraordinary means and therefore are not obligatory.
34. It should be noted that this differs from the notion of indirect causality which
will be discussed below. On the topic of responsibility cf. H. L. A. Hart,
Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: The Clarendon Press 1968). For a
somewhat wider-ranging philosophical discussion of various factors associated
with the notion of responsibility see Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall 1959) Chap. 18.
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to evade the onus of responsibility by maintaining that the death of
the infant was causally independent of any failure to intervene: that
it was due to the neonate's physiological defects which, when
nature was allowed to run its course unaided, predictably took their
toll.
However successful such a defense may be in other cases, it is not
clear that in the present instance it is cogent. Abstracting from the
question of whether the infant died from his multiple defects or
other causes - the issue was already touched upon in (a) above -
the defense itself consists of two strands: one, that the failure to act
was not itself a causal determinant of the ultimate outcome, and that
therefore it ought not to be subject to the same evaluation; the other,
that even if this failure to intervene was a causal determinant, it was
so only indirectly, and that it was the whole spectrum of birth
defects and their natural consequences that really and directly
brought about the death.
Both strands of reasoning have been advanced in recent
discussions; but both are untenable. 35 Vis-a-vis the first, the
following considerations should make this clear. The sequences of
events that constitute the history of the world may properly be
described as consisting of series of causal chains that impinge upon
and causally effect one another. 36 Each point in time, therefore, can
35. For a discussion of the status of a failure to act, see Kirchheimer, supra, who
espouses a position somewhat analogous to that of St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologica 11:11:79:3. See also J. R. Connery, "The Moral Dilemna of the Quinlan
Case" Hospital Progress 56 (16): 18 (December 1975) at 18 f. The notion of
failure to act not having the status of an act is fundamental to the active-passive
euthanasia distinction. On the latter see Marya Mannes, Last Rights (New York,
1974) at 31, who characterizes it as "conveniently tenuous"; W. H. Baugham et
al., "Euthanasia: Criminal Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations",
(1973) N.D.L. 48 1202, at 1207; Sade and Redfern, loc. cit.; Veatch, supra, chap.
3; Paul Ramsey, The Patient as Person (New Haven: Yale University Press 1970)
chap. 3 at 15 1, "In omission no human agent causes the patient's death, directly or
indirectly". But see J. Fletcher, "The Patient's Right to Die" - Downing supra,
at 68; Kluge, supra, at 156 n. 20. On the notion of indirect euthanasia, see Daniel
C. Maguire, Death by Choice (Garden City: Double Day 1974) at 120 ff.; Veatch,
supra, at 101 ff.; Jonathan Bennett, "Whatever the Consequences" Analysis 26
(1966) at 83. In this context, the whole issue of the status of the doctrine of the
double effect is also relevant. For a brief critical discussion of the latter, see Foot,
Supra; E.-H. W. Kluge, "The Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in Crisis
Contexts and the Principle of Double Effect", in Proceedings of the Thirteenth
Conference on Value Inquiry (Geneseo, 1979) at94 and The Practice at 62-4; 3. T.
Mangan, S. J. "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Dougle Effect:
Theological Studies 10 (1949) at 40.
36. Cf. Richard A. Trammel "The Presumption against Taking Life", Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy 3:1 (1978) at 64 f, esp. 65.
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be represented as a situation involving several possible outcomes,
where which one of these possibilities is actualized is a function of
the nature of the preceding casual series, the structure of the extant
situation, and the nature of the casual impetus operative at that point
in time. Such a description, however, would be a description of the
physical events only. It would be deontologically completely
neutral. A description involving moral and legal responsibility,
however, must incorporate an analysis of the physical events in
terms of acts: in terms of the deliberate determination of the flow of
events by a moral agent to one of the several alternatives open at
that point in the causal chain. Such a determination, in turn, may
occur in one of two ways: by means of an interference by the agent
in the established causal sequence, or by means of non-interference
and thereby an allowing or making sure that the established
sequence will proceed to its expected denoument.
The notion of an act, therefore, is neutral with respect to the
question of whether or not any physical activity, any intervention in
the established sequence of causal events, took place. The only
important factor is, whether or not the putative agent was in a
position to determine the eventual outcome. Whether this
determination took place through causal interference or by
non-interference and thus ensuring (allowing) the continuation of
the extant causal sequence is irrelevant. It is this understanding of
the matter that underlies Otto Kirchheimer's statement that
A man who caused another to be drowned by refusing to hold out
his hand would in common language be said to have killed him
.... We ask ... whether the drowning could have been
prevented if the expected action had taken place. When we
answer this question in the affirmative, we confirm the relevance
of the omission as a cause. Under this hypothesis, there is no
difference between the causality of omission and of positive
action, and the same rules, or absence of rules, which govern
commission apply to omission.3 7
The preceding analysis shows why both in theory and in practice,
the failure to intervene may itself be considered an act, and why the
same evaluation is appropriate even though no physical activity took
place.38 The relevance of this for the case at hand is clear. The
physician's failure to intervene, whether surgically or through
intravenous feeding, eventuated, as it was known it would, in the
37. Kirchheimer, supra, at 618 f
38. See also Trammel, loc. cit. Regina v. Instan would seem to confirm this.
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infant's death. Therefore the failure to intervene, even though not a
physical activity, nevertheless was a causal determinant of the
death. And what is more, the decision not to intervene was adopted
precisely because it was known beforehand that if this course was
followed, death would ensue. Therefore it was a deliberate
determination of the death. Whence it follows that the absence of
causal activity cannot be adduced as a relevant parameter, and to
adapt the words of Otto Kirchheimer, "the same rules, or absence
of rules, which govern commission apply to [this] omission".
Nor can this conclusion be avoided by taking into account the
second strand of the argument: the claim that the infant directly died
of the natural consequences of his multiple defects and that the
omissive causal determination was merely indirect. For in the first
instance, section 205(1) states clearly
205(1) A person commits homicide when, directly or indirectly,
by any means, he causes the death of a human being. [emphasis
addedP 9
For statutory purposes, therefore, the physician's plea of the
indirect nature of his involvement cannot free him from
susceptibility to the charge of homicide. Nor, in the second
instance, can the complexity of the causal context be adduced as an
exculpating moment. For, so it must be replied, few causal
situations are simple. Usually, several causal elements interact to
produce a given effect. However, no matter how complex the causal
situation, the following rule holds true: if it is known or reasonably
foreseeable that a given causal determination with respect to one of
the causal elements will result in a certain outcome when the other
causal elements are present, and if these other causal elements are
known to be present, then, all other things being equal,40 the
individual responsible for the particular determination of that causal
element will incur the onus for the final outcome.4 1
In the present instance, all of these conditions are met. The
complex of causal parameters in the form of physiological defects
was known, the result of the failure to intervene in the case of the
atresia was also known, and the possibility of determining the
causal nexus otherwise, by interfering, did exist. Therefore the
responsibility for the ultimate outcome must be ascribed to the
39. Martin's Annual Criminal Code (1976).
40. I.e., there being no other determining agents - in which case the
responsibility would be shared.
41. If he could have determined it otherwise.
242 The Dalhousie Law Journal
determining agent in question, the complexity of the causal situation
notwithstanding. That is to say, it must be ascribed to the physician
and the attending medical personnel.
For statutory purposes, therefore, neither the physician's plea of
the causal complexity of the situation nor of the indirect nature of
his involvement can free him from incurring a charge of homicide.
(d) Culpable Homicide
However, the following consideration obtrudes itself. It might be
argued that since Section 205 distinguishes between culpable and
non-culpable homicide, i.e.,
205(5) A person commits culpable homicide when he causes the
death of a human being,
(a) by means of an unlawful act,
(b) by criminal negligence
there are two ways in which it is possible to exculpate the
responsible physician even if the preceding analysis were to be
accepted: by showing that the act in question 42 was not in fact one
of homicide, or by showing that even though it was one of homicide
it was not culpable.
To establish the first as an exculpating moment in the present
instance requires that it be shown that infant B was not a human
being. That move, however, is clearly blocked; for, section 206
states
206(1) A child becomes a human being within the meaning of
this Act when it has completely proceeded, in a living state, from
the body of its mother whether or not
(a) it has breathed,
(b) it has an independent circulation, or
(c) the navel string is severed.
Undeniably, this section is out of date. For instance, it would be
inapplicable to genetically, morphologically and psychologically
human beings who were gestated in an artificial placenta 43 or in the
intestinal cavity of a non-female person. 44 It would also not apply to
42. For the act-omission distinction, see supra.
43. See G. Chamberlain, "An Artificial Placenta", American Journal of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, 100 (Match 1968) at 615. Paul Ramsey, Fabricated
Man (New Haven: Yale University Press 1970) at 107.
44. At the present time this remains a theoretical possibility, but given techniques
of in vitro fertilization and artificial plancenta (see note 43 supra), it must be taken
into account.
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fetuses in the third trimester as long as they were not born, even
though they were fully developed; 45 etc. These shortcomings,
however, are irrelevant to the point at issue: There is no question but
that infant B was a human being within the meaning of the term as
defined by this section. The charge of culpable homicide, therefore,
is not avoidable by reason of the non-humanity of the infant.
That leaves the second alternative. Although an act of homicide
had been committed, it was excusable by the fact that it fell neither
under clause (a) nor clause (b) of section 205(5). This could be
argued in the following way: Clause (a) does not apply on the facts
alone. Nothing was done in any relevant sense. As to clause (b),
here section 202 is relevant.
202(1) Every one is criminally negligent who
(b) in omitting to do anything that it is his duty to do,
shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or
safety of other persons.
(2) For the purposes of this section, "duty" means a duty
imposed by law.
Section 197, of course, also applies. However - so the reasoning
could continue - both these sections deal with persons, not human
beings. Therefore, unless the locutions "human being" and
"person" are to be construed as synonymous, neither section can
apply to the present case. Infant B, although unquestionably a
human being, was not a person. Consequently clause (b) does not
apply either; wherefore the homicide in question was not culpable.
These last remarks really go to the heart of the present issue.
They focus on the lack of adequate statutory guidelines for
interpreting the locution "human being" vis--v is that of
"person", highlight the consequent ambiguity of the interconnec-
tion between the two locutions, and show up the resultant failure of
sections, that prima facie are intended to be complementary,
actually to mesh. For the alternatives are clear: either the two terms
are synonymous, and then a charge of culpable homicide would
appear justified even though this might conflict with common
ethical sentiment, prosecutorial discretion and medical practice; or
45. One of the ironic consequences of this would be that whereas suit could be
brought on part of an infant for damage sustained in utero, and in that sense for
purposes of the action the infant must have had the status of a person at the time of
the intra-uterin damage (cf. Montreal Tramways Co. v. LUveillg, [1973] S.C.R.
456), that status disappears for purposes of actions under section 206. For a
discussion of problems associated with this, see E.-H.W. Kluge, "'The Right to
Life of Potential Persons", (1977), 3 Dalhousie Law Journal 837.
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they are not synonymous, and then the statutes dealing with the
necessaries of life apply only to persons whereas those dealing with
homicide apply to human beings, wherefore there exists a serious
incompleteness and disjunction in the law.
IV. "Human being" and "Person"
Are "human being" and "person" to be construed as synonymous?
The import of this question extends far beyond the limits of the
present issue. However, confining the discussion within the context
of what has gone before there appear to be at least two reasons why
their synonymity must be rejected. First, any such synonymity
would entail a problem of internal consistency for the Code as a
whole. That is to say, it is a rule of logic that any two terms that are
synonymous may be substituted for one another in extensional
contexts salva veritate.46 In the present instance, however, this is
not possible. The Code considers corporations, societies and the
like to be persons, 47 but it would clearly be the height of absurdity
to declare them human beings on that basis and to accuse of
homicide anyone who brought about the unlawful termination of
their existence.
A second, as it were, external reason why their synonymity
cannot be accepted lies in the nature of the terms themselves.
Whatever its history, the term "human being" currently has an
essentially biological import and denotes membership in the species
homo sapiens. As such, it is associated with certain more or less
delimited and more or less arbitrary criteria for membership in that
species. In that sense, the term is normative in nature; and as our
biological sophistication grows, the limits of the concept as well as
its criteria of application are adjusted accordingly. So, for example,
the term's initial historical focus on the presence of certain overt
physical characteristics has been successively modified 48 until
today it centres around the presence of a specific genetic code
irrespective of whether or not that code is fully expressed. 49
46. Cf. Leibniz. "Non inelegans specimen demonstrandi in abstractis" Oper.
Philos. ed. J. E. Erdman I at 94; Gottlob Frege, Grundlagen der Arithmetik
(Breslau: Koebner 1884) at 65. Arthur Pap, Semantics and Necessary Truth (New
Haven: Yale University Press 1958) at 277 ff.
47. Cf. section 2
48. For a discussion of some aspects of this, see Daniel Callahan, Abortion: Law,
Choice and Morality (New York: Macmillan 1972) chapter 10, esp. at 356-64;
Kluge, The Practice at 88 f.
49. For a discussion of this, see Callahan, supra, esp. at 360 ff.
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However, precisely because the term has essentially biological
import, its normative parameters are without deontological
significance. Any such significance that may be associated with it is
an extraneous and accidental accretion resulting from the close
connection between the truth-conditions of the use of the term and
those of the term "person". For, apart from purely legal conatexts,
the only persons with whom we are familiar in ordinary life are also
members of the species homo sapiens, and by far the largest
proportion of human beings that we encounter are also persons.
Therefore it is easy to conflate the two: to move from talk about the
one to talk about the other and vice versa, without realizing that a
slide has occurred.
Nevertheless, such a move is conceptually illegitimate, its facility
notwithstanding. For, in contradistinction to the term "human
being", "person" is deontologically normative. It too is a category
term, but one that delimits its domain of application not on the basis
of biological characteristics but on the basis of deontologically
significant attributes such as obligations, volitions, choice or right.
To be sure, what falls within the domain of persons thus delimited
will also have certain publicly observable physical characteristics;
and in light of what was said above, it is not surprising that by and
large these parallel or complement those of "human being".
However, the core meaning of the term lies elsewhere, and is not
subject to the vagaries of biological sophistication. Instead, it
resides in the concept of a being with conscious awareness: of a
morally responsible agent. 50
The two locutions, therefore, are logically and conceptually
distinct. Whence it follows that the second of the two alternative
conclusions indicated above in fact obtains. That, however, is an
unsatisfactory state of affairs. In effect, it requires that prosecutorial
discretion determine the interrelationship between the two most
fundamental locutions of this part of the Code on the basis of the
facts as they are apprehended, rather than the classification of the
facts being determined on the basis of the meanings of the terms in
question. Consequently, prosecutorial discretion is exercised on the
basis of what amounts to an a priori judgment of the case. This
50. Cf. Karl Rahner, "Gedankeniber das Steyben" Arzt u. Christ 15 (19) at2s f;
Trubo, supra at 152; Joseph Fletcher, "Ethics and Euthanasia" in R. H. Williams,
To Live, at 115; J. M. Gustafson, "Mongolism" at 544; H. Thielicke, "The
Doctor", at 162 (although Thielicke seems to be ambivalent); H. T. Engelhardt,
Jr., "On the Bounds of Freedom" Conn. Med. 40:1 (January 1976) at 51.
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situation entails a complete reversal of the proper order of things,
and thereby runs the danger of judiciary inconsistency and
politically motivated prejudgment.
What follows is a proposal to rectify this situation by means of a
revision of the Code itself. The focus of this revision will be the
fundamental difference between the two locutions noted above.
Among other things, that difference allows for the possibility that
something may be a human being without being a person. 51 Once
this is incorporated into the statutes, it allows them to reflect the
current distinction between biological life on the one hand and
personal life on the other, 52 which, in turn, makes it possible to
express as a matter of statute what currently, as in the case of infant
B, is a matter of ad hoc discretion, and moreover makes it possible
to deal with situations like this in a manner consistent with the
current moral ethos and with actual medical practice. It also has the
not inconsiderable advantage of being sufficiently general in scope
as to allow for an extension to situations of euthanasia in general.
V. The Harvard Criteria
A fruitful way of approaching the task of revision is by considering
the concept of death as adumbrated in the Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Harvard Medical School, entitled "A Definition
of Irreversible Coma"." Reduced to its bare essentials, that Report
recommends the adoption of the following criteria for the
determination of death:
(1) unreceptivity and unresponsivity to noxious stimulation,
(2) apnea,
(3) absence of all cerebral reflexes, and
(4) isoelectric electroencephalogramme in the absence of central
nervous system depressants and hypothermia, this being
verified at least 24 hours after the initial determination.
51. Cf. Kluge, The Practice at 88-95. Cf. Karl Rahner, supra at 25 f.; D. Arnold,
"Neomorts", University of Toronto Medical Journal, LIV:2 (January, 1977) at 37;
Trubo, supra at 152, 166 et pass.; Joseph Fletcher, "Ethics" at 115, and
"Technological Devices" at 126. But see Bonhoeffer, supra at 110; H. Thielicke,
"The Doctor" at 162 ff.; Gustofson, Supra at 554; Robertson, supra at 247 f.
52. See supra note 51. See also Paul Ramsey, The Patient, chapter 2 pass.; H. T.
Engelhardt, Jr., "On the Bounds of Freedom" at 51 ff.; Peter M. Black, "Brain
Death" I & II, New England Journal of Medicine 299:7 (August 17, 1978) at 338
and 299:8 (August 24, 1978) at 393, which gives a very good discussion of recent
developments from a medical point of view.
53. "A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the
Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death" JAMA 205:6
(August 5, 1968) at 85.
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Although not explicitly stated as such, these criteria amount to a
definition of death in terms of the complete cessation of all brain
function, and in that sense have provided the impetus for a great
deal of medico-legal 54 and philosophical debate.5 5 They have even
come to function as the basis of death-related legislation in various
states of the United States,56 and in a slightly modified version are
fundamental to the 23rd Working Paper of the Law Reform
Commission of Canada.
57
For present purposes, the important point to notice in connection
with the Harvard Criteria is that a patient who meets them may well
be alive according to the traditional criteria that centre around the
presence of a heart beat, respiration and the other vital functions.58
Therefore it may happen that a given patient may be dead according
to the Harvard Criteria while being'alive from the traditional point
of view. 59 The important thing about this, in turn, is that this is
54. For a bibliography on the subject, see E. Jaksetic, "Bioethics and the Law: A
Bibliography", (1976) 2 Am. J. Law and Medicine 263; and Committee on
Evolving Trends in Society Affecting Life, Death and Dying: Determining and
Defining Death - A compilation of Definitions, Selected Readings and
Bibliography (San Francisco California Medical Association 1975). See also "In
the matter of Petition of Louis Mari," Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Plymouth
Superior Court No. CA 77-5062, May 16, 1977; W. J. Curran, "The Brain-Death
Concept: Judicial Acceptance in Massachusetts", (1978) New England Journal of
Medicine 298 1008.
55. L. C. Becker, "Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept", (1975) 4
Philosophy and Public Affairs 334; Hans Jonas, "Against the Stream"
Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974); Paul Ramsey, The Patient, Chap. 2; Robert Veatch,
supra chaps. 1 and 2, Englehardt, supra, at 51 f.; Kluge, The Practice, loc. cit.
The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 3:1 (March 1978) is entirely devoted to
the issue and the articles in it contain good bibliographies.
56. The Kansas statute KSA 77-202 (Suppl. 1974) was the first. Since then
Maryland (1972), New Mexico (1973), Virginia (1973, Alaska (1974), California
(1974) and Oregon (1975) have added similar statutes as have Michigan (1975),
West Virginia (1975), Lousiana (1976) Iowa (1976), Montana (1977), Illinois
(1975), Georgia (1975), Tennessee (1976), Idaho (1977). Cf. F. J. Veith, et al.,
"Brain Death", JAMA 238 (1977) at 1651 and 1744 for summary and discussion of
the legislation until 1977.
57. Working Paper 23: Criteria for the Determination of Death, Law Reform
Commission of Canada (1979) (F. C. Muldoon, J. -L. Baudouin, G. V. La Forest,
E. J. Houston).
58. However, it should be noted that clinical investigation has shown that patients
who meet the Harvard Criteria will not survive as functioning biological organisms
beyond three months, even given the best and most sophisticated medical support
currently available. See Black, supra, at 338 ff, and A. W. Walker and G. F.
Molinari, "Criteria of Cerebral Death". Trans. Am. Neurol. Assoc. 100 (1975) at
29.
59. The Kansas Statute is notorious for difficulties arising in this respect. For a
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possible only because the Harvard Criteria are in fact based on the
distinction between "human being" and "person" discussed
above. In a sense, therefore, the above anomaly is merely a
reflection of that fact. To be sure, neither the Committee itself nor
later commentators have appreciated this, but there is evidence to
show that in fact this is the case. So for example, the Committee
itself said that "responsible medical opinion is ready to adopt new
criteria for pronouncing death to have occurred in an individual
-sustaining irreversible coma as a result of permanent brain
damage," 60 and went on to explain that
From ancient times down to the recent past it was clear that,
when the respiration and heart stopped, the brain would die in a
few minutes; so the obvious criterion of no heart beat as
synonymous with death was sufficiently accurate . . . This is
no longer valid when modem resuscitative and supportive
measures are used. These improved activities can now restore
"life" as judged by the ancient standards of persistent
respiration and continous heart beat. This can be the case even
when there is not the remotest possibility of an individual
recovering consciousness following massive brain damage. 61
The passage as a whole, and particularly the italicized segment,
makes sense if and only if the Committee intended to differentiate
between a patient who is alive in a biological sense only, and one
who is alive qua person; and if, further, the Committee was of the
opinion that it was only the death of an individual qua person that
was of consequence. On that understanding, it becomes apparent
that the Committee in fact tacitly defined personhood in terms of the
present capability of an individual for conscious awareness, and that
it considered the permanent destruction or loss of that capability to
be the destruction or loss of personhood itself: as the death of the
individual qua person. Since it is the brain that functions as the
physiological (neurological) basis of this capability, it is not
discussion, see W. J. Curran, "Legal and Medical Death: Kansas Takes the First
Step" New England Journal of Medicine 284 (1971) at 260; I. M. Kennedy, "The
Kansas Statute on Death - An Appraisal" New England Journal of Medicine 285
(1971) at 946; D. H. Mills, "The Kansas Statute - Bold and Innovative", New
England Journal of Medicine 285 (1971) at 968; R. M. Veatch, supra at 62; L. F.
Taylor, "A Statutory Definition of Death in Kansas" JAMA 215 (1971) at 296;
A.M. Capron and L. R. Kass, "A Statutory Definition of the Standards for
Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal", (1972) 121 Universiy
of Pennsylvania Law Review 87.
60. Seesupra note 53 at 87
61. Id. loc. cit.
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surprising that therefore the Committee singled out its incapacita-
tion beyond functional recovery as indicative of personal death.
To reiterate, therefore, the Harvard Criteria are definitive of the
death of a person, not of that of a human being. However,
understood in that way the notion of death involved amounts to
nothing more nor less than that of the loss of personhood by an
entity who previously was a person. Therefore the Criteria may also
be seen as definitive of the loss of personhood. Loss of personhood,
however, trivially involves the absence of personhood - and
herewith the relevance of all this to the preceding discussion
becomes apparent: if the brain damage (incapacitation) of a
defective neonate is such as to fall under the provisions of the
Harvard Criteria, and apnea obtains, then the neonate cannot be
considered a person in the sense of those Criteria.
VI. Difficulties and Alternatives
This last proposal, however, is still insufficient: it still will not
allow the attending physician to deal with radically defective
neonates of the type of infant B in anything like the manner that
current medico-ethical standards seem to sanction. That is to say,
although the preceding is indeed a logical extension of the Criteria,
it points to a fundamental shortcoming of the Criteria as they stand:
they express the fundamental insight of the distinction between a
person and a human being insufficiently clearly, and are still too
much bound to the traditional conception of death.
A brief reflection on the facts will make this clear. As they stand,
the Harvard Criteria will not allow individuals who are irretrievably
brain damaged and irreversibly comatose with no capacity for
higher brain activities whatever to be declared dead qua persons.
The case of Karen Ann Quinlan and of Elaine Esposito illustrate this
only too well. 6 2 These individuals still evince medullar reflexes and
primitive, purely biological functions like that of independent
respiration. That fact rules out any declaration of death on the basis
of the Criteria. However, this itself makes it clear that in this respect
the Criteria are reverting to the old conception of human (biological)
62. On the case of Karen Ann Quinlan, see In the Matter of Karen Ann Quinlan:
The Complete Legal Briefs, Court Proceedings and Decisions in the Superior
Court of New Jersey (Arlington, Va.: University Publications of America, 1975),
and for a bibliography, The Hastings Center Bibliography at 25; on Elaine
Esposito, see AP release of November 27, 1978 (Victoria Daily Times, November
27, 1978 at 21).
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life as definitive of personal life, and thereby are blurring once
again the distinction between human being and person that provided
the impetus for the Criteria themselves.
The same point may be stated somewhat differently in terms of
the whole brain - higher brain centres distinction. As they stand,
the Criteria, insisting on the absence of all brain reflexes, 63 operate
with a whole-brain conception of personhood:6 4 personhood is
grounded in the present functional capability of the whole brain.
However, as several commentators have pointed out 65 and as was
the underlying motivation for the formulation of the Criteria
themselves, 66 what makes an individual a person is his present
capability for conscious awareness and its attendant ramifications,
such as moral decision capability, perceptual awareness and the
like. These, however, are not functions of the brain as a whole. The
lower brain centres have no part in them. It is only the higher
centres of the brain, the cerebrum, that plays any role. The lower
centres merely govern the organic functioning associated with the
biological life of the body. Therefore by insisting that there must be
no brain reflexes at all, the Criteria, which supposedly distinguish
between personal and merely biological life, in fact present merely
biological life as a sufficient condition for personal life, and by that
fact contradict their own raison d'&tre.
This situation can, of course, be remedied quite easily: simply by
bringing the Criteria themselves into line with their underlying
motivation. Death, i.e., the death of a person, need merely be
defined in terms of the permanent destruction or functional
incapacitation of the higher brain centres. Furthermore, there are
several ways in which such destruction or incapacitation can be
established: by angiography, 67 by ultra-sound techniques,6 8 by
63. See clause (3) supra
64. On the notion of a whole-brain approach, see Capron and Cass, supra, at 104
ff.; Veatch, supra at 68 ff. and "The Whole-Brain Oriented Concept of Death: An
Outmoded Philosophical Formulation", (1975) Journal ofThanatology 13.
65. Cf. Veatch, supra at 71. S. I. Benn, "Abortion, Infanticide and Respect for
Persons" in J. Feinberg, ed., The Problem of Abortion (Belmont: Wadesworth
1973) at 92; Michael Tooley, "A Defense of Abortion and Infanticide",
Philosophy and Public Affairs 2:1 (1972); Kluge, The Practice at 88 ff. and
"Infanticide as the Murder of Persons" in M. Kohl, ed., Infanticide and the Value
of Life (Prometheus Books 1978); Robertson, supra at 246 ff.
66. See supra
67. J. Korein et al., "Radioisotopic Bolus Technique as a Test to Detect
Circulatory Deficit Associated with Cerebral Death", (1975) 51 Circulation 924.
68. J. K. Campbell et al., "Pulsatile Echoencephalography" Acta Neurol Scand.:
The Euthanasia of Radically Defective Neonates: 251
computer tomography, 69 by electroencephalography, 70 etc. But
which ever of these is used - and ideally, several should in used in
combination 7' - if there is found to be a permanent destruction or
incapacitation of the higher brain centres which form the organic
basis of the capability for conscious awareness, then the necessary
condition for personal death will have been met, the continued
presence of reflexes in or function of the lower centres
notwithstanding. At the same time, this will also be a sufficient
condition, since someone whose cerebrum has been rendered
permanently disfunctional can never again attain conscious
awareness.
This notion of present functional capability for conscious
awareness, therefore, by itself allows for a formal definition of
personal death that avoids the shortcomings of the Harvard Criteria.
For, if we distinguish between a natural person on the one hand, and
a constructive person (a legal fiction) on the other, then all of the
preceding can be incorporated into the following definition-
D : A natural person is dead if and only if his higher brain centres
(cerebrum) no longer have the present functional capability
for conscious awareness.
Three things should be noted about this definition. First, it
expresses clearly the prevalent medical attitude towards the
interrelationship between brain-function, conscious awareness and
personal death, and captures the thrust of the motive underlying the
Harvard Criteria themselves. Second, as opposed to some other
recent proposals,72 it does not tie the determination of the presence
or absence of this functional capability to the use of sophisticated
diagnostic machinery. Since the cerebrum deteriorates beyond
functional recovery within 30 minutes of the cessation of
45 (1970) at I; S. Uematsu and A. E. Walker, "A Method for Recording the
Pulsation of the Midline Echo in Clinical Brain Death", (1974) 135 Johns Hopkins
Medical Journal 383
69. C. Radberg and S. Si5derlundh, "Computer Tomography in Cerebral Death"
AciaRadiol Suppl. 346 (1975) at 119
70. D. Silverman et al., "Cerebral Death and the Electroencephalogram", (1969)
209 JAMA 1505; Silverman et al., "Irreversible Coma Associated with
Electrocerebral Silence", (1970) 20 Neurology 525; Robertson, supra pass.
71. Robertson, supra at 399 f
72. Techniques involving angiography, tomography, etc. (see notes 68-70, supra)
suffer from this shortcoming. On the other hand, the proposal of the Law Reform
Commission in its Working Paper 23 (at 59) suffers from the shortcoming that it
would rule out the use of sophisticated technological techniques except where
resuscitative machinery is being used.
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circulation, traditional cardiographic techniques and/or criteria for
determining death will remain fully acceptable. Not, of course,
because they establish the absence of independent cardiac action,
but because after 30 minutes of oxygen deprivation brought about
by cardiac arrest or whatever, the cerebrum has in fact deteriorated.
The traditional criteria, therefore, will remain as sufficient for
determining personal death, but not as necessary. The more
sophisticated electroencephalographic, etc. techniques allow an
earlier determination of personal death because they can detect such
irreversible deterioration prior to the onset of the acute physiologi-
cal breakdown detectable by the old criteria. Therefore, instead of
involving two distinct definitions of death, such as in the Kansas
statute, 73 the proposal above is a single definition that allows for
several types of mutually compatible criteria.
Third, and for present purposes perhaps most importantly, the
proposed definition allows for a clear and unequivocal formulation
of the person-human being distinction as an addition to section 2 of
the Code:
"Person" means any entity capable of acts that fall within the
provisions of this Act. A person may be either a "natural
person" or a "constitutive person". A natural person is any
biological entity of the species homo sapiens that possesses the
present functional capability for conscious awareness, or any
human being whose cerebrum is structurally sufficiently like that
of a normal adult human being that, if it were fully operational
without structural change, it would evince neurological activity
of the same nature as that of a normal adult human being.
A "constructive person" is any association of persons
constituted in such a way as to be able to act as a social agent in
the manner of a natural person.
A "human being" is any living biological entity that is a member
of the species homo sapiens.
VII. Some Proposals
Admittedly, the preceding definition is complex, but nothing less
will be sufficiently precise. Furthermore, it has several points in its
favour. Not only does it provide for conceptual clarity where
currently none exists, but it also allows for a systematic approach to
the whole array of person-oriented problems, beginning with that of
the status of the human embryo and ending with that of the
irreparably comatose and moribund senescent. It provides for an
73. See note 56supra
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answer to the question whether a biological organism is already a
person, is still a person, or is a person no longer. And in doing so, it
makes possible a uniform and consistent procedural determination
of the gamut of cases ranging from abortion to euthanasia, and does
so in a way that captures an essential part of what in recent literature
has gone under the heading of quality of life.
More importantly for the present context, however, is the fact
that it also makes possible a redrafting of those sections of the Code
whose problematical import was the topic of the initial discussion.
The relevant clauses of section 205, for example, could now be
stated like this:
205(1)A person commits homicide when, directly or indirectly,
by any means, he causes the death of a natural person.
(5)A person commits culpable homicide when he causes the
death of a natural person,
(a) by means of an unlawful act,
(b) by means of criminal negligence,
(c) by causing that person, by threats or fear of violence
or by deception, to do anything that causes his death,
or
(d) by wilfully frightening that person, in the case of a
child or a sick person.
With the addition of the amendment to section 2 above, section 205
would rule out any prosecution for culpable homicide in situations
where the being in question is (still or already) a human being but is
not a person. Cases like that of Karen Ann Quinlan or of infant B
could therefore be terminated without the threat of legal action for
culpable homicide. In fact, the whole range of brain damage cases,
which otherwise would be (and currently are) problematic, would
herewith be resolvable in a uniform manner and any conflict
between legal statute and medical ethos and practice would be
avoided. 
74
Furthermore, section 206, which also was relevant to the case of
infantB, could, in its relevant clauses, be rewritten in the following
manner:
206(1)A human being becomes a natural person within the
meaning of this Act when it has acquired the present
74. It is important to note that this would not be the case if the definition of death
proposed in Working Paper 23 of the Law Reform Commission were to be adopted.
It is significant that the proposal of the Commission represents the majority view
and was not accepted unanimously.
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functional capability for conscious awareness, whether or
not
(a) it has proceded from its place of gestation, or
(b) it has actually realized this capability in any
observable manner.
(2) A human being ceases to be a natural person when the
neurological basis of his present functional capability for
conscious awareness is irreparably destroyed or damaged
beyond functional recovery within the limits of person-
hood as set out in section 2 above.
Clause 206(2) would fulfil the role of a definition of death. As to
206(1) (a), there are two reasons for its particular formulation. One
is, that current techniques of in vitro fertilization together with the
present capability for constructing an artificial placenta 75 make it
extremely likely that within the foreseeable future gestation will no
longer take place in utero in all cases. However, it would clearly be
unacceptable to deny personhood to a human being who in all other
respects met the criteria for being a person, except that he did not
proceed ex utero. Similar considerations, mutatis mutandis, apply
to individuals gestated in the specially prepared abdominal cavity of
a non-female person: a medical possibility that also obtains. The
second reason for 206(1) (a) is that given the meaning of "natural
person" as set out above, a fetus will generally become a person at
the end of the first trimester of the gestation period. Consistency,
however, demands that the locality in or at which a person finds
himself is irrelevant to his status as a person. Consequently, if a
fetus attains the status of person prior to leaving the locality of his
place of gestation, that should not provide a bar to his being
accorded the rights to which otherwise he would be entitled."
Other alterations in the remainder of the sections identified above
as being problematic will be apparent. In some cases, such as those
of ss. 197 and 202, few if any changes are required because the
notion of person involved in them is already in accord with the
preceding. In other cases, such as that of ss. 212, 213, and so on,
wholesale redrafting will be necessary, involving at least the
substitution of "person" for "human being" in the majority of
cases. To pursue this matter further, however, transcends the
parameters of the present discussion.
75. See note 43 supra
76. For a consideration of some difficulties surrounding the present legal position
on this issue, see Kluge, "The Right of Life",pass.
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VIII. The Case ofInfant B and a Further Proposal
The implications of these suggested revisions for the.case of infant
B are apparent. The threat of criminal liability facing both medical
practitioner and support personnel under the present statutes would
disappear. By section 206 (1), infant B would not be a person, and
therefore by section 205 (1) no charge of homicide could be laid.
Furthermore, prosecutorial discretion would no longer have to be
relied upon to bring about an agreement between what is current
medical practice and what is law, nor would the decision as to the
meaning of "human being" and "person" have to await appraisal
of the facts at hand. The proper order of determination would
thereby be restored.
Nevertheless, despite these advantages, the proposed statutory
revisions are insufficient. They lead to a moral anomaly. While the
proposed revision will allow the death of neonates like infant B who
do not meet the criteria for personhood, they require that infants
who do meet the criteria be kept alive even though they should face
a life of unmitigated, unbearable agony and suffering. In other
words, the proposed revisions permit neonate non-persons to be
freed compassionately from their suffering, whereas they require
neonate persons to be made to suffer even though they may be
moribund and for the short duration of their life face unmitigated
suffering.
Some contemporary moralists, noteably those of theological
inclinations, would suggest that this is morally quite acceptable. J.
V. Sullivan, for instance, has stated that "suffering is almost the
greatest gift of God's law" ;77 and Helmut Thielicke has argued that
"pain exercises not only a negative function in our life but also a
creative function whereby it helps us to become what we are
supposed to be", 78 and has gone on to say that "suffering could be
part and parcel of our very destiny. What would humanity be if
suffering were to be totally eliminated and we knew nothing but the
absurd happiness of dull lemurs?" 79 However, most contemporary
theologians seem to differ in their opinion8 o and their position is
77. Sullivan, supra, at 73. See also On Dying Well Anglican Church Information
Office (1975) at 21.
79. Thielicke, "The Doctor", at 166
79. Id. at 165
80. Even Thielicke himself seems to vacillate. See id., at 165. "It is surely part of
man's nature to combat suffering, and in this respect to protest against the natural
processes which impose this suffering upon us". For a clearer statement, however,
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reflected more accurately by Dean Inge's confession, "I do not
think that God willed the prolongation of torture for the benefit of
the soul of the sufferer"; 81 an assertion, incidentally, that is in clear
accord with Pope Pius XII pronouncement on the use of
extra-ordinary means. 82 As to the medical position, its sympathies
also lie in the other direction, and are more appropriately expressed
by the following suggestion: 83
Life preserving intervention should be understood as doing harm
to an infant who cannot survive infancy, or will live in intolerable
pain, or cannot participate even minimally in human
experience.
8 4
A morally acceptable redrafting of the Code would therefore have
to avoid this anomaly. One way of doing so is to suggest that the
physician (or individual in charge) 85 may make use of analgesics
and the like in whatever dosages are deemed necessary to alleviate
the pain and suffering even though such ministration should entail,
and should be known to entail, a shortening of the life-expectancy
of the infant concerned. 86 However, while in theory such an act
would be distinguishable from one where the medication was given
in order to procure "a fair and easy passage",87 the distinction
would prove impossible to demonstrate in actual practice. 88
Therefore, in order to avoid profitless legalistic entanglements, the
see L. Weatherhead, The Christian Agnostic (Hodder and Stoughton, 1965) at 187;
Peter Green, The Problem of Right Conduct at 283; Karl Barth, supra, at 425 ff
(who talks of medical "fanatics" in this context); Ramsey, The Patient chap. 2
pass. The admission that extra-ordinary means need not be used also falls here. Cf.
Pope Pius XII, "Prolongation of Life", (1957) 4 Osservatore Romano 393; Gerald
Kelly, "The Duty of Using Artificial Means of Preserving Life", (1950) 11
Theological Studies 204 and Medico-Moral Problems (St. Louis: Catholic Hospital
Association 1958); Edwin Healy, S. J., Medical Ethics (Chicago, 1956) at 70.
81. W. R. Inge, Christian Ethics and Moral Problems at 373
82. Pope Pius XII, "Prolongation of Life" at 393
83. Jonsen et al, supra at 760
84. Cf. John Lorber, "Selective Treatment of Myelomeningocele: To Treat or Not
to Treat" Pediatrics 53: 3 (March, 1974) at 307, and "The Doctor's Duty to
Patients and Parents in Profoundly Handicapped Conditions", in D. J. Roy, supra;
but see J. M. Freeman, "Ethics and Decision Making Processes for Defective
Children" in Roy, supra; Kluge, "Infanticide", supra; Engelhardt, "Euthanasia
and Children: The Injury of Continued Existence", (1973) 83 Journal of
Pediatrics, 170.
85. After all, there is no guarantee that such decisions will always have to be made
in a medical setting.
86. Cf. T. Lohmann, Euthansie i.d. Diskussion (Patmos, 1975) at 97 f
87. Bacon, A New Atlantis
88. Cf. Kluge, "The Allocation", at 97 f
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statutes should simply accept the fact that from a contemporary
ethical point of view the termination of irremediable suffering is
acceptable and that in such cases considerations of the quality of life
outweigh considerations of the fact of life itself. In statutory terms,
this may be expressed as follows:
S.197(4) (a) No one is under a legal duty to provide the
necessaries of life for an infant under his charge if
the exercise of that duty would result in the
existence or continuation of a state of irremediable
pain and/or suffering beyond a reasonable level.
(b) In all cases that fall under the preceding paragraph,
the attending physician or person in charge shall
employ such measures as are deemed, upon due
consideration, to be suitable and appropriate for'
terminating the life of the infant under his charge as
quickly and as painlessly as possible.
The implications of this proposal do, of course, extend beyond
the context of defective neonates, moribund or otherwise. With due
alteration of detail, the proposal could be extended to cases
involving adult persons as well as adult human beings. In that way,
it could become the means for enacting general euthanasia
legislation that would be more reflective of the current medical
ethos. However, desirable as such an extension might be, to address
this topic would transcend the limits of the present discussion.
In conclusion, a note of warning: unless the distinction between a
human being and a person is formally accepted in statute, and unless
some provision for the termination of hopelessly suffering infant life
is enacted, physicians will continue to find themselves in conflict
with the law while in agreement with public ethics. Such a conflict,
however, not only casts serious doubt on the moral responsiveness
of the law but also presents a danger: in leaving to individual
prosecutorial discretion what should be a matter of statutory law, it
-aises the spectre of the politics of medico-legal confrontation.
